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When people look at pictures, they usually report that 
they are consciously aware of the pictures. However, 
visual consciousness can be manipulated easily with 
many different methods (Kim & Blake, 2005). For ex-
ample, when pictures are shown in quick succession or 
close in space, visibility of the pictures may be reduced 
and thus masked (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Enns 
& Di Lollo, 2000). As a result, participants may report 
that they are not consciously aware of the masked pic-
tures (Esteves & Öhman, 1993). Does this self-report 
demonstrate that the participants were truly unaware 
and thus unconscious of the pictures? Alternatively, if 
the participants can discriminate among the pictures 
better than chance even though they deny awareness, 
does this demonstrate that the participants were actu-
ally aware and thus conscious of the pictures? These 
questions have been debated for more than a century 
(Eriksen,  1960;  Hannula,  Simons,  &  Cohen,  2005, 
2006; Holender, 1986; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 
2001;  Schmidt  &  Vorberg,  2006;  Wiens,  2006a, 
2006b; Wiens & Öhman, 2007). This debate concerns 
which measure is best to index visual consciousness. 
However,  in  this  discussion  about  a  valid  measure, 
the  conceptualization  of  visual  consciousness  has 
often been only implicit (Reingold & Merikle, 1990). 
Therefore, this paper outlines traditional and modern 
concepts of visual consciousness and discusses wheth-
er measures are available that capture these concepts 
adequately. 
TRADITIONAL THRESHOLD  
CONCEPTS OF VISUAL  
CONSCIOUSNESS
Early  psychophysics  argued  for  the  existence  of  a 
sensory or observer threshold (Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). This hypothetical threshold was presumed to be 
internal to the participant and not directly measurable 
with  response  behavior;  nonetheless,  it  determines 
whether or not a stimulus is sensed. This assumption 
has been central to research on subliminal perception 
(Merikle et al., 2001). Researchers assumed the exist-
ence of an internal threshold or limen of perceptual 
awareness and tried to study the degree to which stim-
ulus processing occurs below this threshold (subliminal 
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= below threshold). The reasoning was that if it can be 
shown that processing occurs below this threshold, and 
thus in the absence of perceptual awareness, then this 
would  be  strong  evidence  for  subliminal  perception, 
as awareness could not be a necessary condition for 
stimulus processing (Frith, Perry, & Lumer, 1999). This 
approach is also called dissociation procedure because 
findings require a dissociation between awareness and 
another measure (Holender, 1986; Schmidt & Vorberg, 
2006). The dissociation procedure has received wide 
interest  in  determining  whether  there  is  subliminal 
processing of emotional input (for a general review, 
see Wiens, 2006a; for a review of brain imaging stud-
ies, see Wiens, 2006c).
Although  the  notion  of  a  sensory  threshold  has 
intuitive  appeal,  contemporary  psychophysics  has 
abandoned this concept. Specifically, signal detection 
theory (SDT) is a more parsimonious model that ac-
counts for many findings without the concept of an 
internal  sensory  threshold  (Macmillan  &  Creelman, 
2005). SDT assumes an internal continuum of sensory 
states, which is generally referred to as “strength of 
evidence” (Pastore, Crawley, Berens, & Skelly, 2003). 
SDT assumes further that because of internal noise, 
there  is  no  point  on  the  internal  continuum  that 
separates  indisputably  between  the  presence  and 
absence of a signal. Accordingly, because of internal 
background noise, the presence of a signal may evoke 
a small internal response, whereas the absence of a 
signal may actually evoke a strong internal response. 
Therefore, at any position on the internal continuum, 
only probability statements are possible about whether 
or not a signal was present. When deciding about what 
to respond, participants choose a cut-off point on this 
internal continuum. In a detection task, this criterion 
determines whether participants respond yes or no. On 
each trial, participants respond yes if the internal re-
sponse exceeds this criterion; otherwise, they respond 
no. If the proportion of yes-responses on signal trials 
(hits) exceeds the proportion of yes-responses on no-
signal trials (false alarms), participants can discrimi-
nate  between  signals  and  no-signals.  Discrimination 
ability is commonly indexed by d’ (pronounced as d 
prime). Aside from discrimination ability, SDT allows 
response biases to be measured, which refer to par-
ticipants’ tendency to favor one response (e.g., yes-
responses) and are commonly indexed by beta or C 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wiens, 2006c). 
Although the notion of a sensory threshold does not 
match  contemporary  psychophysics,  Cheesman  and 
Merikle (1984) distinguished two other threshold con-
cepts in subliminal perception. The objective threshold 
is the “level at which perceptual information is actually 
discriminated at a chance level” (p. 391), and the sub-
jective threshold is the “level at which subjects claim 
not to be able to discriminate perceptual information 
at better than at a chance level” (p. 391). Several con-
cepts in SDT may be considered as possible candidates 
for the objective and subjective threshold (Macmillan, 
1986; Wiens, 2006c). However, because the theoreti-
cal basis of the objective and subjective threshold as 
well as their measurement are unclear (for discussion, 
see  Wiens,  2006c),  the  remainder  of  this  paper  fo-
cuses on modern concepts of visual consciousness, but 
an attempt is made to subsume traditional threshold 
concepts under modern theories.
MODERN CONCEPTS OF VISUAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS
Many theories of visual consciousness have been pos-
tulated. Although these theories differ widely in their 
conceptualization,  it  may  be  possible  to  distinguish 
three  broad  aspects  of  visual  consciousness.  These 
have  been  referred  to  as  phenomenal,  access,  and 
reflexive  consciousness  (Block,  2001).  Phenomenal 
consciousness  refers  to  the  experience  of  conscious 
content, access consciousness refers to content that 
is accessible, and reflexive consciousness refers to a 
state of introspection about the content of conscious-
ness. For example, people in a movie theater may be 
experiencing  the  film  (phenomenal  consciousness), 
they  have  content  information  available  about  the 
characters, plot, and audience (access consciousness), 
and they are self-aware of being in a movie theater 
and watching a film (reflexive consciousness). A similar 
distinction between phenomenal consciousness (first-
level affect) and reflexive consciousness (second-level 
awareness) has been proposed for emotional experi-
ence (Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Wiens, 2005).
Phenomenal consciousness
Phenomenal  consciousness  refers  to  the  experience 
of content associated with visual perception (qualia), 
for example, seeing red as red and green as green. 
However,  the  minimal  features  of  phenomenal  con-
sciousness have yet to be determined. For example, it 
is unclear if phenomenal consciousness can exist before 
features are bound together (e.g., red and table to red 
table) (Lamme, 2003). A measure of phenomenal con-
sciousness does not need to capture the mechanism 
of qualia (how it is generated, which is referred to as 
the  hard  problem  of  consciousness).  It  is  sufficient Concepts of visual consciousness and their measurement
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that it assesses whether phenomenal consciousness is 
present or absent. Self-report is commonly accepted 
as an accurate index of the presence of phenomenal 
consciousness. If participants report (verbally or via 
button press) that they are aware of a picture (e.g., this 
is a red table), they are considered phenomenally con-
scious. This notion of self-reported consciousness may 
correspond to the concept of the subjective threshold 
(discussed above). But, although reported stimuli may 
indicate the presence of phenomenal consciousness, it 
is unclear if unreported stimuli necessarily indicate the 
absence of phenomenal consciousness.
Unreported stimuli show absence of  
phenomenal consciousness?
Many studies have contrasted conditions in which 
participants  reported  the  presence  versus  absence 
of  phenomenal  consciousness  (Frith  et  al.,  1999). 
However,  self-reported  absence  of  phenomenal  con-
sciousness may not actually indicate that phenomenal 
consciousness  is  absent.  For  example,  participants 
may participate in a detection task in which they re-
spond whether or not they are aware of faces (yes 
or no). According to SDT, the participants place the 
criterion for yes-responses somewhere on the internal 
continuum. Although it is conceivable that this criteri-
on placement may capture the threshold for phenom-
enal consciousness, its placement is arbitrary and is 
often affected by manipulations of the pay-off matrix 
(e.g., by rewarding correct responses). In the present 
example, the participants may vary in their criterion 
(response bias) of what they consider to be sufficient 
evidence to report that they see a face. That is, some 
participants may report that they see a face only if 
they can clearly see all facial features (conservative 
response  bias),  whereas  some  participants  may  al-
ready report that they see a face if they see two eyes 
(liberal response bias). Hence, the participants may 
not differ in their actual phenomenal consciousness, 
but their self-report differs because of differences in 
response biases. 
To reduce individual differences in criterion place-
ment (response bias), the participants may be instruct-
ed on where they ought to place their criterion (e.g., 
which facial features need to be experienced to report 
awareness). Alternatively, the participants may be al-
lowed to rate the degree of phenomenal consciousness 
on a continuous scale. This approach provides evidence 
about  whether  self-reported  phenomenal  conscious-
ness  is  continuous  or  binary.  For  example,  studies 
of visual masking suggest that participants generally 
rate their phenomenal consciousness on a continuum 
(Esteves & Öhman, 1993), whereas research on the 
attentional  blink  suggests  that  participants  report 
their phenomenal consciousness to be binary (Sergent 
& Dehaene, 2004). Nonetheless, although continuous 
scales  of  self-reported  phenomenal  consciousness 
may be preferable to the arbitrary dichotomization into 
yes- and no-responses, it is unresolved whether par-
ticipants who report the lowest level on a continuous 
scale have no phenomenal consciousness.
A common argument against the notion that self-re-
ported absence of phenomenal consciousness reflects 
its actual absence has been finding that people can 
often discriminate visual input even if they deny phe-
nomenal consciousness (Holender, 1986). Indeed, SDT 
accommodates the observation that unreported stimuli 
can be discriminated (Haase, Theios, & Jenison, 1999; 
Macmillan, 1986). The reason is that unreported signals 
show only that these stimuli fall below the response 
criterion (misses in SDT terms) and do not necessarily 
demonstrate that participants cannot differentiate be-
tween signals and no-signals (i.e., unreported signals 
do not demonstrate that d’ = 0). Even if a participant 
has excellent ability to differentiate signals from no-
signals (d’ > 0), many signal trials will be reported as 
missed if the participant has a conservative response 
bias  (i.e.,  is  unwilling  to  report  awareness).  Hence, 
because unreported signals (misses) do not rule out 
that the participant could differentiate between signals 
and no-signals, unreported signals do not appear to 
be convincing evidence for the absence of phenomenal 
consciousness. 
Zero discrimination ability shows absence 
of phenomenal consciousness?
Many  researchers  have  advocated  a  definition  of 
the absence of phenomenal consciousness in terms of 
participants’ inability to discriminate signals from no-
signals (i.e., d’ = 0). However, because it is debated 
how  to  index  discrimination  ability,  it  is  possible  to 
argue that any measure (e.g., electrodermal activity) 
reflects  phenomenal  consciousness.  Unfortunately, 
this  argument  would  make  it  logically  impossible  to 
study processes in the absence of phenomenal con-
sciousness  because  any  evidence  of  discrimination 
ability would, by definition, demonstrate phenomenal 
consciousness per se (Bowers, 1984). However, even 
if only standard behavioral tasks are allowed, it may 
be unclear which task is appropriate to assess discrim-
ination ability (Duncan, 1985). For example, ability to 
discriminate among masked pictures might be meas-
ured with a task in which participants have to choose 
between  two  verbal  labels  (e.g.,  spider  or  snake). 352
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However, it is possible that although the participants 
may not be able to label the targets, they might be 
able  to  discriminate  correctly  between  the  two  cat-
egories if no explicit labels are given (e.g., darker vs. 
lighter). If so, a discrimination task with explicit labels 
might  be  considered  an  insensitive  and  thus  invalid 
measure  of  awareness  (Lovibond  &  Shanks,  2002). 
In fact, this question about appropriate measurement 
(i.e., operationalization) is already evident in the origi-
nal studies by Cheesman and Merikle (1986), in which 
performance on either a simple yes-no word detection 
or a more complex word-identification task was used 
interchangeably as an index of awareness.
Further, absence of phenomenal consciousness is 
often defined as chance performance (for review, see 
Wiens, 2006a). However, this is an attempt to prove 
the  null  and  requires  strong  statistical  power  to 
avoid a Type 2 error (falsely concluding that non-sig-
nificant performance reflects absence of phenomenal 
consciousness). Because studies vary in the number 
of  trials  and  significance  criterion,  non-significant 
findings have been challenged on lack of statistical 
power (Hannula et al., 2005). Further, to obtain a 
reliable index of discrimination ability, many trials 
are required at low visibility. As a consequence, poor 
performance  may  reflect  lack  of  motivation  rather 
than  absence  of  discrimination  ability ( Merikle  & 
Daneman, 2000).
In general, these arguments illustrate the challenge 
to find a measure that is exhaustive and thus captures 
all aspects of phenomenal consciousness completely 
(Merikle & Reingold, 1998). Accordingly, if a measure 
is not exhaustive, any purportedly unconscious effects 
might actually be due to conscious processes that were 
missed by the (inexhaustive) measure of awareness 
(Wiens & Öhman, 2007). To avoid this discussion, two 
alternative  approaches  have  been  suggested.  First, 
Reingold and Merikle (1988) proposed to compare the 
relative sensitivity of two measures. If it is assumed 
that one measure (direct measure) is at least as sensi-
tive to conscious processes as a second measure (in-
direct measure), then greater effects on the indirect 
than direct measure would demonstrate that these ef-
fects were due to unconscious processes. Because this 
approach compares only relative sensitivities between 
two measures, it is not necessary that either measure 
is  an  exhaustive  measure  of  awareness  (Schmidt  & 
Vorberg, 2006). Second, it may be beneficial to treat 
awareness as a continuous variable and to study dose-
response  relationships  between  changes  in  aware-
ness and other variables (Wiens, 2006a). If research 
shows that changes in awareness differ qualitatively 
from changes in other variables (Merikle & Cheesman, 
1987), these findings would suggest that changes in 
other variables occur independently from changes in 
awareness (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). These two ap-
proaches are worth pursuing because they attempt to 
identify processes that are independent from changes 
in awareness (Schmidt, this volume). However, they 
are not helpful for the present discussion because they 
say little about the status of phenomenal conscious-
ness per se based on discrimination ability and self-
report.
In fact, the main conceptual issue in indexing phe-
nomenal  consciousness  with  discrimination  ability  is 
that this ignores the principally subjective nature of 
phenomenal consciousness. That is, it seems more rel-
evant to measure what people experience subjectively 
rather  than  what  they  can  discriminate  objectively 
(Bowers, 1984; Wiens & Öhman, 2002). By analogy, 
the experience of pain per se is not captured by peo-
ple’s ability to discriminate pain stimuli objectively, but 
only by the fact that they experience them subjectively 
as painful (Wiens, 2006b).
Phenomenal consciousness despite zero 
discrimination ability?
Most researchers would probably agree that phe-
nomenal  consciousness  is  absent  if  there  is  strong 
evidence (e.g., relevant discrimination task, sufficient 
power) that discrimination ability is absent (d’ = 0). 
However, several researchers suggest that self-report 
and discrimination ability may not be sensitive enough 
to  index  phenomenal  consciousness  (Block,  2001, 
2005b; Lamme, 2003, 2006; for the notion of micro-
consciousness, see Zeki, 2003). Accordingly, d’ =  0 
may not be sufficient to guarantee absence of phe-
nomenal consciousness. Block (2001) illustrates this 
point with a task modeled after the Sperling (1960) 
study on iconic memory. When arrays of letters (e.g., 
3 x 3) are presented briefly, participants report that 
they can see all the letters, although they can actually 
report and discriminate only a few of them. According 
to Block, this example demonstrates that phenomenal 
consciousness is much broader than what self-report 
and discrimination ability suggest. Similarly, Lamme 
(2003) proposed that processes are either phenom-
enally  unconscious  or  conscious.  If  the  processes 
that are phenomenally conscious are attended, they 
result in self-report and discrimination ability. (Lamme 
talks about “conscious report,” but in his examples on 
change blindness, he uses discrimination performance 
as  evidence  for  phenomenal  consciousness.)  Thus, 
many processes are phenomenally conscious but do Concepts of visual consciousness and their measurement
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not affect self-report and discrimination ability unless 
they are attended. 
Although interesting, this model has two drawbacks. 
First, attention is considered secondary to phenomenal 
consciousness;  however,  because  in  lower  animals 
there is stronger evidence for attention than phenom-
enal consciousness, these data suggest that attention 
is more basic than consciousness. Notably, Dehaene 
and his colleagues proposed a model that considers 
consciousness to be secondary to attention (Dehaene, 
Changeux,  Naccache,  Sackur,  &  Sergent,  2006). 
Accordingly, some processes are always unconscious 
even if attended (subliminal processes). Because at-
tention may facilitate these processes even if they re-
main unconscious, these findings demonstrate that at-
tention is independent from consciousness (Naccache, 
2005). Further, processes that have the potential to 
become conscious are considered conscious (phenom-
enally) if they are in the current focus of attention and 
preconscious if they are currently outside the focus of 
attention. In sum, attention either selects the aspect 
of phenomenal consciousness that is available to self-
report and discrimination ability (Lamme), or mediates 
phenomenal consciousness (Dehaene).
Second, because this view implies that any behav-
ioral measure may be too insensitive to index the ab-
sence of phenomenal consciousness, it seems difficult 
to validate this model because even complete absence 
of self-report and discrimination ability (d’ = 0) may 
not necessarily demonstrate absence of phenomenal 
consciousness.  However,  it  has  been  proposed  that 
recurrent processing may be necessary and sufficient 
for phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2005b; Lamme, 
2006). Recurrent processing refers to feedback loops 
between  brain  areas  and  is  distinguished  from  the 
feedforward sweep, which is the direct activation of 
cells  in  successive  stages  of  the  cortical  hierarchy 
(Lamme, 2004). In fact, Lamme (2006) proposed that 
behavioral measures ought to be abandoned as the 
gold standard in favor of neural measures (i.e., recur-
rent processing). Lamme argues that phenomena of 
split brain, neglect/extinction, change blindness, inat-
tentional blindness, and attentional blink may be fail-
ures of processes other than consciousness (e.g., fail-
ures of language, attention, and memory). If recurrent 
processing is present in these conditions, it would sup-
port the notion that these patients have phenomenal 
consciousness. Further, if behavioral effects of visual 
input can be shown to correspond more closely to the 
percept  (phenomenal  consciousness)  rather  than  its 
physical properties, these findings would support the 
presence  of  phenomenal  consciousness.  Breitmeyer, 
Ro, and Singhal (2004) studied this latter question for 
masked color priming. Participants were shown blue, 
green, and white disks that were masked with blue 
and green rings. Due to this meta-contrast masking, 
the participants could not discriminate among the blue, 
green, and white disks. Nonetheless, when the par-
ticipants had to name the color of the rings as quickly 
as possible (blue or green), they were faster to name 
the color of the green than the blue rings when these 
were preceded (primed) by a white disk. In contrast, 
when  the  participants  labeled  the  color  of  the  disk 
(blue, green, or white), they tended to mislabel the 
white disks more often as blue than green. Because 
white was physically closer to green than blue, these 
findings suggest that unconscious color priming in the 
absence  of  discrimination  ability  follows  the  physi-
cal properties of the prime rather than the percept. 
According to Lamme’s model, these findings suggest 
that masked color priming is truly phenomenally un-
conscious. In support, research suggests that visual 
masking  eliminates  recurrent  processing  (Lamme, 
2004), which Lamme considers to be necessary and 
sufficient for phenomenal consciousness.
No phenomenal consciousness despite 
good discrimination ability?
The  most  difficult  situation  in  deciding  about  the 
status of phenomenal consciousness is when discrimi-
nation ability is present (d’ > 0) although participants 
report  no  phenomenal  consciousness.  As  discussed 
above,  it  seems  unreasonable  to  conclude  that  any 
evidence  of  discrimination  ability  per  se  is  proof  of 
phenomenal  consciousness,  because  lower  animals 
and machines can perform discrimination tasks with-
out  apparent  phenomenal  consciousness.  Similarly, 
because conclusions about d’ > 0 are often based on 
significance testing, and because sufficient power may 
result in significance even for a tiny effect size, it also 
seems  unreasonable  to  conclude  that  any  deviation 
from nill (e.g., d’ > .01) in itself indicates phenomenal 
consciousness (Wiens, 2006a). 
  However,  observations  of  blindsight  in  humans 
clearly  challenge  the  idea  that  d’  >  0  reflects  phe-
nomenal consciousness (Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; 
Weiskrantz,  1986;  Weiskrantz,  Warrington,  Sanders, 
&  Marshall,  1974).  These  patients  have  damage  to 
the  primary  visual  cortex  and  are  typically  consid-
ered to be clinically blind in the damaged visual field. 
However, experiments have shown that these patients 
can localize light flashes accurately in their damaged 
visual field. Critically, patients can localize light flashes 
accurately  but  categorize  them  as  blanks  (i.e.,  no 354
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light flash) when given the option to do so. Indeed, 
blindsight  patients  commonly  report  that  they  have 
no phenomenal consciousness of any light flashes in 
the damaged visual field and need to be encouraged 
to guess the location of the light flashes. Therefore, 
patients perform well in localizing light flashes even 
though  they  deny  phenomenal  consciousness  of 
the lights in their damaged visual field (they exhibit 
blindsight).  Notably,  patients  vary  in  their  degree 
of blindsight. That is, few patients report absolutely 
no phenomenal consciousness whatsoever (Type 1), 
whereas the majority of patients report some vague 
experiences (Type 2) (Weiskrantz, 1997). 
Extensive research on humans and monkeys sug-
gests that alternative explanations for the observed 
findings are unlikely (Azzopardi & Cowey, 1997; Cowey, 
2004; Cowey & Stoerig, 1995; Stoerig, Zontanou, & 
Cowey, 2002). This research has provided good evi-
dence that targets in the damaged visual field are not 
classified as blanks merely because they may appear 
somewhat less visible than targets in the undamaged 
visual field (and thus fall below the response criterion). 
That is, when target contrast in the undamaged visual 
field was reduced considerably (which also reduced lo-
calization performance), targets in the damaged visual 
field were still classified as blanks (even though locali-
zation  performance  was  excellent).  Hence,  although 
blindsight patients may exhibit conservative response 
biases, their detection performance remains affected 
after controlling for the confounding effect of response 
biases (Azzopardi & Cowey, 1997). Further, the find-
ings  do  not  appear  to  be  due  to  a  lower  frequency 
or to different outcomes (e.g., no rewards) associated 
with targets in the damaged than undamaged field (for 
further discussion, see Wiens, 2006c). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that blindsight patients (at least 
of Type 1) do not have phenomenal consciousness.
According to Lamme’s (2003) model, blindsight pa-
tients ought to have phenomenal consciousness if they 
show recurrent processing. However, Lamme (2006) 
suggests that blindsight is one of the manipulations 
that  eliminate  phenomenal  consciousness  (i.e.,  no 
recurrent processing). Aside from blindsight, Lamme 
believes this to be true for visual agnosia, backward 
masking,  dichoptic  masking,  transcranial  magnetic 
stimulation, and binocular rivalry. Lamme postulates 
that these conditions show no phenomenal conscious-
ness (i.e., no recurrent processing), whereas conditions 
of  split-brain,  neglect/extinction,  change  blindness, 
inattentional  blindness,  and  attentional  blink  show 
phenomenal  consciousness  (recurrent  processing) 
that cannot be reported. The main argument for this 
distinction is that in the first case (e.g., blindsight), in-
formation remains completely inaccessible, whereas in 
the second case (e.g., inattentional blindness), infor-
mation can potentially be accessed but is currently not 
because of manipulations in attention, memory, and 
language. For example, because change blindness and 
inattentional  blindness  disappear  when  participants 
attend to the relevant location of the changes, these 
conditions demonstrate phenomenal consciousness. In 
contrast, blindsight has no phenomenal consciousness 
because no manipulation seems to restore self-report 
of phenomenal consciousness, and because visual in-
put in the lesioned field does not elicit behavior spon-
taneously (only in forced-choice tasks). 
One difficulty with this argument is that whereas 
self-reported absence of phenomenal consciousness is 
considered as too insensitive in cases such as inatten-
tional blindness, it is now allowed as evidence in blind-
sight. Also, it is unclear why blindsight may not also 
be due to difficulties in attention; that is, blindsight 
patients  may  experience  phenomenal  consciousness 
but cannot report it because they cannot attend to it. 
Last, Lamme refers to observations that visual input 
does not elicit behavior spontaneously. This argument 
mirrors the proposal of a close relationship between 
phenomenal consciousness and the functional effects 
of  consciousness  (i.e.,  access  consciousness,  dis-
cussed below). If so, this argument seems inconsistent 
with the suggestion that phenomenal consciousness is 
separate from other aspects of consciousness. 
Taken  together,  in  the  Lamme  model,  recurrent 
processing indicates phenomenal consciousness, and 
self-report and discrimination ability cannot be used 
to  decide  about  absence  of  phenomenal  conscious-
ness. Although there is strong evidence that recurrent 
processing  may  be  necessary  for  phenomenal  con-
sciousness, it is unclear if it is sufficient. Unfortunately, 
because there is no external evidence other than re-
current processing itself to demonstrate phenomenal 
consciousness, it is not apparent how this model can 
be tested scientifically.
Phenomenal consciousness is phenomenal
Introspection supports the notion of a phenomenal 
consciousness that is much richer than is captured by 
self-report and discrimination ability. For example, in 
discussing the task in the Sperling (1960) study, Block 
(2001) argues that participants experience phenom-
enal consciousness of all the letters, but they cannot 
report and discriminate more than a few (see Lamme, 
2003, for a similar argument). However, despite some 
face  validity,  common  sense  does  not  support  the Concepts of visual consciousness and their measurement
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notion  that  phenomenal  consciousness  may  include 
experiences of which people are completely unaware 
themselves (Rosenthal, 2002). Accordingly, Dehaene 
et al. (2006) propose that the impression of a detailed 
phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. Because peo-
ple can potentially attend to details, they falsely believe 
that they actually have phenomenal consciousness of 
all of them. To support this perspective, Dehaene et 
al. refer to cases of inattentional blindness and change 
blindness. There, large changes in visual input are not 
detected unless they are attended. 
However,  an  alternative  explanation  is  that  the 
participants  in  the  Sperling  (1960)  task  may  have 
phenomenal consciousness of the letters, but that this 
phenomenal consciousness does not include the expe-
rience of the identities of the letters (Rosenthal, 2002). 
Similarly, when shown pictures, participants may rap-
idly experience that they are viewing a landscape or 
a  city  skyline ( VanRullen  &  Thorpe,  2001).  That  is, 
within a brief interval people may experience the gist 
of  a  picture  rather  than  its  details.  In  higher-order 
thought (HOT) theory, these experiences are referred 
to as thoughts (e.g., landscape), and these thoughts 
define phenomenal consciousness (Rosenthal, 2002). 
Notably, HOTs are not limited to complex and compli-
cated processes (e.g., I am aware that I am looking 
at a picture of a landscape), but apply also to simpler 
processes (e.g., This is a landscape). In sum, HOTs 
fit intuitive notions of what consciousness means and 
seem more parsimonious than an information process-
ing mechanism that generates phenomenal conscious-
ness with many details of which only a subset is avail-
able to affect discrimination ability and self-report.
Access consciousness
The concept of access consciousness is best understood 
in terms of the function of consciousness. Because the 
brain consists of numerous specialized networks that 
operate in parallel, there needs to be a process that 
integrates this flow of information. Many theories state 
that consciousness is the agent that is responsible for 
this  integration  of  information  (Baars,  2002,  2005). 
Block (2001) assigned the term access consciousness 
to describe this complex process of information inte-
gration within the brain. In support of its importance, 
access consciousness seems to be required to generate 
unusual, novel, and spontaneous behavior (Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001). There are many theories about the 
neural  mechanisms  of  access  consciousness  (Baars, 
2002).  For  example,  Dehaene  and  Naccache  (2001) 
propose  that  global  workspace  neurons  (mainly  in 
prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices) mediate ac-
cess consciousness through attentional amplification of 
specialized networks (e.g., visual cortex). Thus, access 
consciousness is not localized to a particular brain region 
but is reflected in dynamic patterns of brain activation.
Because access consciousness refers to a complex 
process  of  information  integration,  discrimination 
ability seems to be the measure of choice, whereas 
self-report may be less sensitive. Thus, in a task that 
is  novel  or  requires  strategic  behavior,  evidence  of 
discrimination ability may be taken as good evidence 
for access consciousness even in the absence of self-
reported unawareness. However, task complexity may 
not be a relevant criterion to infer access conscious-
ness. For example, reading is a complex task that may 
become completely automatic and require little or no 
access  consciousness  to  result  in  semantic  priming 
(Dehaene et al., 1998). 
Because  the  concept  of  the  objective  threshold 
(discussed  above)  focuses  on  discrimination  ability, 
it may be closest to access consciousness. However, 
access  consciousness  cannot  be  inferred  from  dis-
crimination ability per se but depends on the context 
that requires novel or strategic behavior. To illustrate, 
although blindsight allows for accurate discrimination 
ability (i.e., localization of targets in the damaged vis-
ual field), this is not considered as sufficient evidence 
for access consciousness, as food-deprived monkeys 
with blindsight do not reach for food presented in their 
blind  field  (Cowey,  2004).  Thus,  information  in  the 
blind field is not directly accessible even though it can 
affect discrimination ability.
Although  access  consciousness  may  be  concep-
tualized  as  separate  from  phenomenal  conscious-
ness (Block, 2001), this point is currently debated. 
For example, Baars and Laureys (2005) argue that 
phenomenal  and  access  consciousness  reflect  the 
same process: Information that is accessed is phe-
nomenally conscious. As mentioned above, Dehaene 
et al. (2006) share this view but distinguish further 
among subliminal, preconscious, and conscious proc-
esses. Processes are subliminal if they can never be 
accessed,  preconscious  if  they  can  potentially  be 
accessed  but  are  currently  not  (because  they  are 
not  attended),  and  conscious  if  they  are  currently 
accessed  (and  thus  accompanied  by  phenomenal 
consciousness). Dehaene et al. suggest that precon-
scious processes are not accompanied by phenom-
enal consciousness (because they are not accessed). 
In contrast, as discussed in the section on phenom-
enal consciousness, this view is not shared by Block 
(2005b)  and  Lamme  (2003).  As  paraphrased  by 356
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Block (2005a), “the content of experience can exist 
in the back of the head without access to it in the 
front of the head” (p. 270).
Reflexive consciousness
Reflexive  consciousness  refers  to  the  self-awareness 
of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., I am aware that 
I  am  reading  an  article  on  consciousness).  Reflexive 
consciousness has also been referred to as introspec-
tive or monitoring consciousness (Rosenthal, 2002) to 
reduce potential misunderstanding, as the term reflex-
ive implies reflex-like processing even though its actual 
meaning is closer to reflective processing. A convincing 
illustration of the independence of reflexive conscious-
ness from phenomenal and access consciousness may 
be observations of mind wandering. People may experi-
ence mind wandering without noticing that their minds 
are wandering (Schooler, 2002). That is, people may 
have phenomenal consciousness of ongoing events and 
respond to these events (access consciousness) with-
out  any  self-awareness  (no  reflexive  consciousness) 
of what they are doing or looking at. Thus, reflexive 
consciousness may be closest to the process of notic-
ing.  Because  it  has  been  argued  that  the  subjective 
threshold  (discussed  above)  ought  to  capture  what 
people  notice  (Bowers,  1984),  it  may  be  subsumed 
under reflexive consciousness. Indeed, it is possible to 
argue that processes are unconscious unless they result 
in reflexive consciousness (Dienes, 2004).
Because  reflexive  consciousness  is  introspective, 
self-report  is  the  measure  of  choice.  Unfortunately, 
many  studies  have  interviewed  participants  only  at 
the end of the experiment about their consciousness 
during the experiment. This post-hoc assessment may 
confound  reflexive  consciousness  with  memory.  So, 
unless reflexive consciousness is defined as awareness 
that can be recalled some interval (e.g., minutes) after 
the actual event, the measure should be assessed im-
mediately after the event (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). 
Although self-report has intuitive appeal, it has been 
criticized because participants may differ in their intro-
spective report even though their discrimination ability 
may be similar. However, because reflective conscious-
ness is, by definition, introspective and thus relies on 
self-report, it is irrelevant whether or not participants 
can actually discriminate visual input.
Unfortunately, phenomenal consciousness is some-
times described to include features of reflexive con-
sciousness. This makes it difficult to separate the three 
aspects of visual consciousness conceptually. This dif-
ficulty can be illustrated in the discussion of blindsight. 
Patients with blindsight report that they are not aware 
of any targets, but when forced to do so, they can 
discriminate the location of these targets. Thus, their 
reflexive consciousness suggests absence of phenom-
enal consciousness. In this research, patients are al-
lowed to report the apparent absence of targets by 
classifying targets as blanks (empty trials). This option 
is commonly referred to as a “commentary key,” which 
implies  reflexive  consciousness.  However,  because 
blindsight  has  also  been  demonstrated  in  monkeys, 
blindsight  may  not  indicate  impaired  reflexive  con-
sciousness  (i.e.,  monkeys  may  not  have  to  be  self-
aware  that  they  experience  blanks)  (Block,  2005b). 
Instead, patients may have no phenomenal conscious-
ness of the targets in the damaged visual field and just 
report it as such (e.g., there is nothing there). Further, 
they may have no ability to access and use the infor-
mation to control behavior (no access consciousness). 
This example illustrates that reflexive consciousness 
is  best  reserved  for  processes  in  which  participants 
monitor their own awareness introspectively.
Conclusion
There is no single behavioral measure that captures all 
aspects of visual consciousness, but different meas-
ures can be used to assess different aspects of visual 
consciousness. Discrimination ability may be useful in 
indexing access consciousness, for example in strate-
gic and novel behavior. Self-report is an excellent tool 
to assess the presence of reflexive and phenomenal 
consciousness. However, evidence for the presence of 
any aspect of consciousness may be easier to obtain 
than for its absence. Thus, it is a matter of debate 
first, whether the absence of discrimination ability and 
self-report demonstrates absence of phenomenal con-
sciousness, and second, whether the presence of dis-
crimination ability despite self-reported unawareness 
indicates phenomenal consciousness. As illustrated by 
research on blindsight, patients show good discrimi-
nation ability on localization tasks, but report blanks 
on detection tasks. Thus, patients indicate absence of 
phenomenal  consciousness  despite  findings  of  their 
preserved ability to localize the targets. To distinguish 
behaviorally between the apparent absence and pres-
ence  of  different  aspects  of  visual  consciousness,  I 
advocate the concurrent use of behavioral measures 
of  discrimination  ability  and  self-report.  Here,  self-
report refers to measures that are methodologically 
sound (e.g., online visibility ratings rather than post-
experimental interviews). When combined with brain 
imaging methods, these measures will contribute to Concepts of visual consciousness and their measurement
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our understanding of the conditions that are necessary 
and sufficient for various aspects of visual conscious-
ness and will help determine whether various aspects 
of  visual  consciousness  have  independent  neural 
mechanisms.
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